

25X1

Top Secret



Ninth Report

**COMMUNIST VIOLATIONS OF
THE VIETNAM AND LAOS SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS**

(This report covers the week from
13 April through 19 April 1973)

*This memorandum has been prepared jointly by the
Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of Defense*


DIA review(s) completed.

10

25X1

Top Secret

27
20 April 1973



25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP80T01719R000100160004-3

Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP80T01719R000100160004-3

20 April 1973

Ninth Report

COMMUNIST VIOLATIONS OF
THE VIETNAM AND LAOS SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS*

(This report covers the week from
13 April through 19 April 1973)

The Key Points

- Infiltration of North Vietnamese combat troops into South Vietnam has almost certainly now come to an end for this dry season. Infiltration of civil and military specialists has slowed but not stopped.

25X1

- Heavy North Vietnamese logistic activity, however, continues all along the Ho Chi Minh trail. Hard evidence shows that the NVA now has large stockpiles of munitions in Quang Tri Province.
- The number of combat incidents initiated by the Communists continued at moderate levels in both South Vietnam and Laos.

* This report has been prepared jointly by the Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of Defense.



The Details

NOTE: This is the ninth in a series of reports detailing recently received evidence of (a) Communist efforts to infiltrate new manpower and military materiel toward and into South Vietnam, and (b) Communist-instigated combat activity in violation of the Vietnam and Laos settlement agreements.



A. Infiltration and Redeployments of North Vietnamese Personnel



[REDACTED]

25X1

[REDACTED]


25X1 3. As [REDACTED] three North Vietnamese SA-2 sites near Khe Sanh in Quang Tri Province were occupied. A fourth firing battalion of the North Vietnamese SAM regiment known to be in the Khe Sanh area was not observed [REDACTED] but was observed as recently [REDACTED] 25X1 Newly received evidence indicates that there may in fact be five firing battalions subordinate to this SAM regiment, but we have seen only four of them equipped and operational at the same time. A preliminary field report received earlier in the week which suggested that the North Vietnamese had installed "dummy" launchers and missiles at one of the SA-2 sites has turned out to be incorrect.

B. Movement of Military Equipment and Supplies Toward and Into South Vietnam and Laos

25X1 4. The level of Communist logistic activity remained high during the reporting period in both northern South Vietnam and southern Laos. Most significant, we received hard evidence of large North Vietnamese stockpiles of weapons and ammunition presently in place in Quang Tri Province. Vehicle activity was heavy in both GVN MR-1 and throughout the Laos Panhandle. The flow of traffic entering the Laotian Panhandle from North Vietnam remained at the same level as the previous week. In the southern part of North Vietnam, new evidence received during the week shows a substantial flow of goods--probably both civilian and military--southward through the North Vietnamese Panhandle. [REDACTED] 25X1


5. The following instances of Communist logistic activity were observed in South Vietnam during

the period. Activity observed in South Vietnam probably reflects supplies which have recently entered the country. (The map on the following page shows the roads and route numbers which appear below.)



25X1

- (c) During the period 13 through 18 April, there were 106 southbound NVA cargo vehicles observed moving on Route 1033 in the western DMZ.




25X1

- (e) the following NVA logistic activity was observed on roads in northern South Vietnam:

- (1) 8 cargo trucks were traveling on Route 548 in the A Shau Valley region west of Hue (5 south, 1 north, 2 parked).
- (2) On Route 547 southwest of Hue 8 cargo trucks were observed

Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP80T01719R000100160004-3



Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP80T01719R000100160004-3

(1 eastbound, 2 westbound, 5 parked).

(3) There were 71 cargo vehicles on Route 9 between Dong Ha and Khe Sanh (29 eastbound, 10 westbound, 32 parked).

(4) 26 cargo trucks were reported on Route 616 southeast of Khe Sanh (17 northbound, 2 southbound, 7 parked).

(f) [] 45 cargo vehicles were reported on Route 9 west of Dong Ha (38 westbound, 7 parked).

(g) Recent evidence indicates that the road previously observed being reconstructed by the Communists southward from Mimot, Cambodia, now extends into South Vietnam's Tay Ninh Province. The rebuilt road provides a connection between Route 13 in Tay Ninh Province and Route 7 in southeastern Cambodia, and by-passes the legal re-supply check point at Xa Mat.

6. During the reporting period the following indications of North Vietnamese logistic activity in southern Laos were noted. Historical precedent would suggest that much of this activity probably involved supplies destined for South Vietnam.

(a) Vehicle activity was observed on Route 99 during the reporting period as follows:

(1) [] 53 cargo vehicles were reported on the route between Muong Nong and its intersection with Route 96 south of Ban Bac (9 northbound, 31 southbound, 13 parked).

25X1

(2) [] there were 96 cargo trucks reported on the route

25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP80T01719R000100160004-3

west of Ban Bac (31 northbound, 65 southbound).

25X1

- (3) [] there was a total of 22 cargo vehicles reported southwest of Muong Nong (9 northbound, 12 southbound, 1 parked).

25X1

- (4) [] 72 cargo trucks were traveling on the segment between Muong Nong and the route's intersection with Route 96 (22 northbound, 45 southbound, 5 parked).

25X1

- (5) [] 41 cargo trucks were observed on the route segment between Muong Nong and the intersection with Route 96 (8 northbound, 18 southbound, 15 parked).

25X1

- (6) [] 57 cargo vehicles were observed on the route west of Muong Nong (6 northbound, 14 southbound, 37 parked) and 144 trucks were reported on the segment south of Muong Nong (22 northbound, 17 southbound, 105 parked).

25X1

- (b) During the period 12 through 18 April, 60 cargo vehicles were observed on Route 9211 south of Saravane (25 northbound, 35 southbound).

- (c) [] 44 cargo vehicles were seen on Route 912 northwest of Tchepone (5 northbound, 2 southbound, 37 parked). [] 25 vehicles were detected on this same route (7 northbound, 2 southbound, 16 parked).

25X1

- (d) During the period 13 through 19 April, 343 southbound vehicles were observed

25X1

Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP80T01719R000100160004-3

25X1

Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP80T01719R000100160004-3

moving south on Route 912 through the Ban Karai Pass and 277 moving north.

25X1

- (e) [] 20 cargo vehicles were observed on Route 966 east of Chavane adjacent to the South Vietnam border (12 eastbound, 8 parked).

25X1

- (f) [] 45 cargo vehicles were observed on Route 92 north of Muong Nong (9 northbound, 4 southbound, 32 parked). There were 39 trucks reported on this route on 16 April (22 northbound, 6 southbound, 11 parked).

25X1

C. Combat Activity Initiated by Communist Forces In South Vietnam Since the Ceasefire

8. In South Vietnam, the total number of Communist-initiated ceasefire violations reported by the South Vietnamese Armed Forces since 28 January and for the last week (13-19 April) are shown below:

Military Region	Total Since Ceasefire Level of Action		Last Week (13-19 Apr) Level of Action	
	Major	Minor	Major	Minor
MR 1	771	2,647	45	101
MR 2	184	1,231	3	102
MR 3	275	1,742	22	132
MR 4	407	3,770	25	298
Totals	1,637	9,390	95 (104) 1/	633 (652) 1/

1/ Denotes totals of previous week.

25X1

Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP80T01719R000100160004-3

9. Some of these violations may have been initiated by GVN forces rather than Communist forces, and it is impossible in all cases to determine the actual instigator. The table above and the chart on the following page, however, do show fairly accurately the trend in the amount of combat that has occurred in South Vietnam since the ceasefire. The fact that a combat incident occurred at a particular time and place is generally reported accurately by the South Vietnamese, even though the question of who started it may not always be treated in objective fashion. In some cases, the Joint Military Commission (GVN/PRG) also reports violations of the ceasefire.

10. The following is a chronological listing of only the most significant "major" Communist violations of the ceasefire in South Vietnam that were reported by the South Vietnamese Armed Forces during the past week.


MILITARY REGION 1

- (a) On 11 April, 14 miles southwest of Hue, elements of an ARVN infantry battalion received an enemy attack by fire followed by a ground assault.
- (b) On 14 April, 12 miles south-southwest of Hue, an ARVN infantry battalion received an enemy attack by fire followed by a ground assault.
- (c) On 15 and 16 April, 8 miles northwest of Hue, elements of an ARVN infantry battalion received three separate enemy attacks by fire totaling 770 mixed mortar rounds. Two of the attacks were followed by ground assaults.
- (d) On 15 April, 14 miles south-southeast of Hue, elements of an ARVN infantry battalion received an enemy attack by fire of 67 mortar rounds.




CEASE-FIRE VIOLATIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAM AS REPORTED BY RVNAF (28 JANUARY 1973 TO THE PRESENT)


JAN-FEB




APR



MAR



MAY



- (e) On 16 April, 15 miles southwest of Hue, elements of an ARVN infantry battalion received an enemy attack by fire of 90 mortar rounds.

MILITARY REGION 2

- (a) On 14 April, a VNAF UH-1 helicopter received enemy ground fire of an unknown type 2 miles southeast of Bong Son. The helicopter crashed and burned.
- (b) On 16 April, 2 miles south of Bong Son, elements of an ARVN infantry battalion received an attack by fire consisting of 65 rounds of mixed ordnance.

MILITARY REGION 3

- (a) The Communists continued to keep military pressure on the Tonle Cham area during the week, through almost daily attacks by fire.

MILITARY REGION 4

- (a) On 15 April, 13 miles northeast of Chau Duc, elements of an ARVN infantry battalion and a reconnaissance company received two separate enemy ground attacks.
- (b) On 16 April, 16 miles southwest of Vi Thanh, a VNAF helicopter received enemy ground fire and was forced to make an emergency landing. The aircraft was then destroyed by an enemy anti-tank rocket round.
- (c) On 16 April, 13 miles northeast of Chau Duc, a VNAF helicopter received enemy ground fire and crashed.

- (d) On 18 April, six miles northwest of Tri Ton, a ranger battalion received an attack-by-fire of 250 rounds of mixed mortar fire.

D. Combat Activity Initiated by Communist Forces in Laos During the Week from 13 through 19 April

11. Heavy North Vietnamese shelling attacks southeast of the Plain of Jars in Laos Military Region II forced Royal Lao Army (FAR) units in the Tha Vieng area to withdraw in some disarray on 12 April. Toward the end of the week the FAR units began to reorganize themselves south of Tha Vieng. By this attack the Communists have gained full control of Route 4 in Xieng Khouang Province. Elsewhere in MR II, there were five minor contacts east of Sala Phou Khoun and two west of Bouam Long. In South Laos, a significant Communist-initiated military action took place on 19 April south of Thakhek, and a flurry of incidents occurred northeast of Khong Sedone earlier in the week.

12. Following is a brief account of significant combat incidents which occurred between 13 and 19 April, and which were clearly initiated by Communist forces in violation of the Laos ceasefire agreement:

- (a) Beginning on 13 April, a government force located northeast of Khong Sedone in MR IV experienced a series of five enemy attacks. Several of the Government units were forced to withdraw slightly to the southwest.
- (b) On 14 April, Royal Lao Government forces continued withdrawing southward from all positions in the immediate Tha Vieng area of MR II in the wake of the 12 April shelling attacks. There were no signs of pursuit by the enemy, although several friendly units were ambushed as they attempted to withdraw across the Nam Gniap River southeast of Tha Vieng.

- (c) On 15 April, Government forces successfully crossed the Nam Gniap river under Lao Air Force cover and continued withdrawing southwestward from the Tha Vieng area. These troops were not further harassed during the day; however, an enemy force of undetermined size attacked a Government defensive position northeast of the FAR base at Pha Dong, forcing the defenders to abandon the position. (Pha Dong is 30 kilometers west of Tha Vieng).
- (d) On 16 April, there was only light activity countrywide as withdrawing Government units south of Tha Vieng began to stabilize and regroup.
- (e) On 17 April, activity again was light. Government elements continued to regroup southwest of Tha Vieng without incident.
- (f) On 18 April, the only activity reported in MR II was a company-size ambush of a FAR unit northeast of Pha Dong. Activity elsewhere in Laos remained at a low level.
- (g) On 19 April, a Government company was forced to abandon its position southeast of Thakhek in MR III after it came under heavy mortar attack. The withdrawing company subsequently was ambushed and dispersed. No other significant activity was reported.

25X1


Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP80T01719R000100160004-3

Next 4 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP80T01719R000100160004-3

25X1

Top Secret



Top Secret